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INTRODUCTION:
Individual accountability is deeply intertwined with the concept of combatting corporate
misconduct. Bolstering the ability to pursue individual accountability in the context of corporate
wrongdoing greatly reinforces the public’s trust in both the government and also the particular
institution or sector. The effects of curbing this level of accountability greatly erodes public trust.
An example of such erosion occurred in 2008 and began with the bursting of the subprime
mortgage bubble.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, no CEO’s went to prison, only one executive served
prison time, and companies largely just paid penalties.1 Often times, the gains these companies
made were greater than the penalties they paid for the same conduct. This has caused a
significant amount of wariness amongst the general public regarding the financial sector. But
more significantly, this has fostered sentiments of distrust regarding the government and its
desire to hold executives accountable. A similarly circumstance is occurring now, though not in
the banking sector, it is taking place within the context of healthcare system.
In 2015, spurring from the ashes of the financial crisis, Deputy Attorney General Sally
Yates authored the famed Yates Memorandum2, which set out a policy aspiring to promote
holding individual members of a corporate entity accountable and re-instilling public trust. The
summation of this memorandum is that a corporation must cooperate fully to receive any
cooperation credit during a prosecution.3 In other words, if a company chooses to cooperate, they
must do so fully, and this includes being cooperative about any wrongdoing its own employees
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committed while at the company. The impetus for this memo arose from the significant amount
of public mistrust regarding the banking sector, as well as for the Department of Justice (the
“Department”) itself.4
Today, the country is faced with an additional crisis, the Opioid Epidemic. This phrase
describes the ballooning of overdoses, deaths, and hospitalizations arising from the use of opioid
products occurring in recent years.5 In 2017, HHS declared the Opioid Crisis a public health
emergency and announced a 5-point plan to combat this epidemic. However, this plan has done
nothing to address the corporate misconduct and individual accountability that spurred this crisis.
While a number of pharmaceutical manufacturers are implicated in the commission of this
crisis,6 virtually no pharmaceutical executives have been held individually accountable for their
role in perpetuating, and for some executives, manufacturing this crisis.
This absence of individual accountability is not a result of the Department’s lack of an
appetite for holding executives accountable, though this may be how the public often perceives
it. Instead, the lack of accountability is likely a product of the fact that it is difficult for
prosecutors to overcome the mens rea requirements imposed by the federal statutes addressing
opioid related misconduct such as the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (the “CSA”).7 Often
times, as an alternative, prosecutor will push for lesser administrative sanctions, settlements, or
attempt to bring charges under the False Claims Act or another statute, to facilitate some type of
accountability against these entities and associated individuals. Under the CSA, it is very
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difficult to prove the requisite intent for pharmaceutical manufacturers by analyzing and
assessing discoverable documents. The Department has focused more on bringing about
settlements for wrongdoing by large corporations, as opposed to following through with
individual prosecutions of executives.8 To prosecute an individual under the CSA, the
government must show that pharmaceutical executives knowingly violated the applicable
statute.9 More on this later, but it is important to note that this is a very high bar and is the
primary reason that more individuals have not been held to account for their role in this crisis.
This article proposes a reduction in the mens rea requirement for prosecuting
pharmaceutical executives and individuals under the CSA. A reduction of the mens rea
component of the CSA from a “willful and intentional” standard to a lesser “recklessness”
standard would substantially facilitate prosecuting individual executives in the pharmaceutical
industry and would greatly curb related wrongdoing.
Part I will provide background information about the opioid epidemic and introduce the
concept of “diversion.” The main purpose of this section is to provide all of the relevant
background information necessary to adequately understand the circumstances that necessitate
this proposal.
Part II will focus on the CSA, the relevant intent standards, and the difficulties associated
with prosecuting individual manufacturers under this standard.
Part III will continue on by highlighting contemporary litigation surrounding the modernday opioid epidemic, discussing the relevant entities and their role in the crisis, and identify
shortfalls and potential obstacles to the aims championed by the government under the CSA.
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Part IV will conclude by discussing the proposed change to the law, conducting an
analysis of this law change, and discussing the potential impact that this change will have to the
opioid epidemic and public trust as a whole. The aim of this section is to demonstrate how the
reduction of the intent standard within the CSA will facilitate the accomplishment of the twin
aims of the CSA while also curbing the appetite by pharmaceutical manufacturers to continue the
perpetration of this crisis for profit.
PART I: The Opioid Epidemic and “Diversion”
The Opioid Epidemic has devastated the country. In 2016, opioid overdose deaths
reached a peak, killing 42,000 people.10 This was more deaths than any previously recorded
year.11 The next year it increased to 47,000.12 Of these overdose deaths, approximately forty
percent directly involved the use of prescription opioids. What makes this more devastating are
the potential avenues that this misuse can lead to. Approximately eighty percent of individuals
who use the illegal drug heroin, first misused legally prescribed opioids.13 Around five percent of
individuals who misuse prescription opioids eventually transition to heroin, a cheaper
alternative.14
The origins of this crisis commenced long before 2016. In the late 1990s, opioid
manufacturers began to convince the medical community that patients could not become
addicted by taking prescription opioid pain relief medication.15 Doctors then began prescribing
these medications much more freely than they otherwise would have. The result of this rhetoric
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spurred the formation of an environment ripe with misuse and diversion.16 It was these
manufacturers who helped foster this environment and create this crisis. Companies like Purdue
L.P., implemented targeted and sometimes deceptive marketing practices to identify physicians
with high numbers of chronic-pain patients, often highlighting the least discriminate prescribers
in the process.17
The evolution of this crisis is marked by three waves of deaths. The first began in the late
1990’s with the increase of prescribing opioids. The second occurred in 2010 with a rapid
increase in opioid related overdoses resulting from heroin use. The final wave began in 2013 and
peaked in 2017, this is marked by the increase in opioid overdose deaths involving synthetic
opioids like fentanyl.18
To thoroughly grasp the scope of wrongdoing involved in the opioid crisis, it is
instructive to delve into the concept of “diversion,” with particular emphasis on how it relates to
the CSA.
In 1970, the Congress of the United States of America enacted into the law the CSA.19
The CSA is the legal foundation for the government’s struggle to curb the abuse of drugs in the
country.20 This law is a consolidation of various drug laws that existed at the time. The CSA
requires that manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of controlled substances, register with
the DEA. These registrants may not violate the CSA or any of its implementing regulatory
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framework. Such violations may result in administrative enforcement actions, civil penalties, or
criminal prosecutions by the Department, as discussed below.
Diversion occurs when controlled substances transactions take place outside of the closed
system of distribution established by the Congress.21 Diversion may occur at any point in the
supply chain for a particular drug.22 Any of the registrants, whether they are manufacturers,
distributors, physicians, pharmacies, or researchers, have the potential to illegally divert
opioids.23 The person receiving the drug for medical use is typically not a registrant.24 Any of the
registrants, whether they are manufacturers, distributors, physicians, pharmacies, or researchers,
have the potential to illegally divert opioids.25 In 2007, the DEA estimated that prescription drug
diversion constituted an approximately $25 billion-a-year industry.26 This number has since
increased.
Again, it is important to emphasize that the act of diversion may occur at any point within
the drug supply chain.27 Diversion may occur within a supply chain at the wholesale level of
manufacturing and distribution and can often include the theft of medication that is in the process
of transport.28 It may occur at the retail level, often involving the theft of specific drugs by
employees of medical and pharmacological institutions.29 Additionally, diversion may occur
through the use of stolen, forged, or misused prescriptions.30 The last and perhaps the most
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significant form of diversion occurs at the patient level and through the use of “pill mills” and
“doctor shopping.” These terms refer to inappropriate prescribing and the seeking if prescription
medication under false pretense, respectively.31 Often, medical practices that constitute a “pill
mill” prescribe significantly above average amounts of controlled substances. From a business
standpoint, these high-volume prescribing “pill mills” could be extremely lucrative to a
pharmaceutical company, particularly those that are unscrupulous enough to knowingly or
recklessly market to these doctors.
The CSA attempts to protect the public from these dangers by curbing the allures of
catering to these illegitimate institutions making it illegal to knowingly supply them with drugs.
However, the CSA does not pose enough of a deterrent, nor does it equip the government with
the adequate tools to pursue and curb this type of diversion. An explanation of the CSA, the
“knowing” standard under the statute, as well as the tools that the Government has available to
curb this conduct, is warranted.
PART II: The Controlled Substances Act, the Associated Intent Standard, the
Government’s Tools
The CSA statute encompasses two aims: to protect the public from the dangers associated
with addictive controlled substances being diverted into the marketplace; and to ensure that
patients may have adequate access to these substances with legitimate medical usage.32
A violation of the CSA’s recordkeeping provision only requires that the government
demonstrate negligence. This standard is satisfied when the actor “adverts to the possibility of
harm, and then acts or fails to act either with the express purpose of achieving the harm, or with
knowledge that the proscribed harm must inevitably follow his act or omission, however much
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he may not desire the consequences.”33 However, to find an individual guilty of violating the
trafficking and manufacturing provisions of the statute, the act must have been done knowingly
or intentionally.34 The term “knowingly” describes that the individual acted consciously or with
knowledge or completely understanding of the circumstances surrounding a particular
situation.35 Additionally, the person is also thought to have satisfied this standard if they are
“substantially certain” that specific conduct will actualize such a result.36 This applies to a
conspiracy to violate the CSA as well. This standard serves as a protection from the public
against prosecutorial overreach. At the same time, it provides a substantial barrier to prosecutors
attempting to find individual members of a pharmaceutical manufacturing company liable for a
conspiracy to violate the CSA by diverting opiates.
The “knowing” or “intentional” mens rea requirement under the statute’s trafficking and
manufacturing provisions is substantially more difficult for prosecutors to satisfy than the lesser
“negligence” standard under the recordkeeping provision. This intentional harm standard may
serve as one of the extreme poles of the spectrum of intent. Negligent conduct found to be
appropriate to bring forth civil liability under the recordkeeping provision, would be the other
end of this spectrum.37
Federal law authorizes the DEA to pursue legal action to prevent the diversion of
controlled substances and promote the protection of public safety.38 Since 1973, the DEA has
been the agency responsible with the implementing of regulations relating to the CSA.39 The
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DEA is responsible for making certain that controlled substances transactions take place within
the “closed system.”40
As allowed by 21 U.S.C. §§ 824(c)(2)(A) and 824(d)(1), the DEA may use administrative
enforcement actions to revoke, suspend, or deny any registrant from continuing their
registration.41 Registrants may be issued an Order to Show Cause, in an effort to explain the
basis for the initiation of the DEA administrative proceedings that could potentially lead to
sanctions and other adverse actions.42 More significant violations receive a more significant
response. The DEA may encourage a registrant to voluntarily surrender their license.43 If the
registrant refuses, the DEA may issue an Immediate Surrender Order against the license of the
registrant; to successfully implement an Immediate Surrender Order, the DEA must demonstrate
that there was evidence of “imminent danger to public health or safety.”44 Civil and criminal
action are reserved for more “extreme cases” with the DEA opting to pursue administrative
action in the run of cases.45
Registrants must identify and report suspicious orders to the DEA.46 Under 21 C.F.R. §
1301.74, suspicious orders constitute orders of “unusual size, orders deviating substantially from
a normal pattern, and orders of unusual frequency.”47 The trouble is, these suspicious orders are
often not recorded.48 In fact, a Diversion Program Manager described the system as a “joke,”
where registrants more often than not, do not report anything unless they were formerly subject
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to a Memorandum of Agreement with the DEA for a previous violation of DEA regulations.49
Under the Code of Federal Regulations, registrants are not required to state why they believe a
particular order is suspicious, creating an environment where inconsistent standards and
thresholds are applied to unusual order behavior/50
A review by the Office of the Inspector General (the “OIG”) in 2019 found that since
2000, the DEA did not respond with the appropriate haste or zeal required to address the
diversion of opioids. A Diversion Program Manager expressed to the review that field division
staff had not received access to the suspicious order database until 2017, approximately one
decade after it was established.51 In the same review, the OIG found that DEA policies and
regulations put in place to prevent diversion and hold registrants accountable, generally did not
adequately do so.52
Clearly these controls, particularly when coupled with the “knowing and intentional”
standard, create a system that cannot adequately contend with opioid diversion. These controls
typically are not taken seriously until the actual entity or individual has been found guilty of
previous wrongdoing. Additionally, as will be clarified further when discussing current litigation
surrounding opioid diversion, it is often very difficult to find evidence that clears the high burden
imposed by this standard. For instances, a review of internal emails and documents surrounding a
particular instance of diversion alleged to have taken place at an institution, may not definitively
demonstrate that an individual had actual knowledge of the diversion. At the same time, it is very
possible that while demonstrable evidence of a conspiracy to violate the CSA by committing
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diversion does not exist, the actual diversion, or at least conspiracy to violate the CSA by
engaging in diversion, may exist.
What then, would be sufficient to curb diversion to such an extent that the “opioid
epidemic” would cease to be an “epidemic?” How can the individual registrants be held to
account with an adequate level of deterrence to dissuade them and their parent entity from
engaging in or facilitating diversion? The answer to these questions is much simpler than it may
seem on its face: a reduction of the mens rea or intent standard within the portion of the CSA
governing opioid diversion for pharmaceutical manufacturers.
This would adequately hinder the opioid epidemic by holding individual executives
accountable for the wrongdoing that occurred under their watch. Fear of individual
accountability would go a long way. Strict liability is a complete lack of a mens rea requirement,
and therefore, will not be discussed within the mens rea spectrum. “Recklessness” or “reckless
conduct” falls somewhere in the murky middle of previously discussed spectrum of intent.53 It is
this standard that we will look to as a way to address the above questions. But first, it is useful to
further outline the intent standard under the CSA as it presently stands.
The caselaw surrounding the CSA has helped clarify the high mens rea requirement for
the statute. McFadden v. United States, a Supreme Court case from 2015, clarified that the CSA,
which makes it illegal to knowingly manufacture, distribute, or possess with the intent to
distribute control substances, necessitates that the government must establish the defendant knew
that the substance being dealt with was a substance regulated under the CSA.54
In United States v. Feingold, the 9th circuit, additionally clarified this standard by stating
that a healthcare professional may be guilty of a CSA violation, if the government can

53
54

Id.
McFadden v. U.S., 576 U.S. 186 (2015).

11

demonstrates that the professional intentionally acted outside the usual course of professional
practice.55
Neither of these contours is directly applicable to the context of opioid diversion
regarding pharmaceutical manufacturers and executives. At the same time, these cases serve to
demonstrate the centrality of the intentional standard within the CSA. The reason for this is
because in Anglo-American criminal law, it is a fundamental principle that the so-called criminal
conduct was done with a level of intent, to be punishable.56 This is to avoid punishing individuals
who act involuntarily or who act without a so-called “criminal intent.”57
So-called “reckless conduct” occurs when an individual has: “(1) actual knowledge that a
course of conduct he is about to embark upon involves a high degree of risk of causing death or
substantial harm to another, and (2) a conscious decision to risk occurrence of the harm.”58
Under these conditions, the actor cannot be found to have intended harm, but instead to have
risked the occurrence of harm.59 Regarding the CSA, this standard would create a higher duty of
care for executives and pharmaceutical manufacturers. The hope is that these entities, and the
individuals making the decisions, would take greater care to avoid blatant pill mills and other
obvious avenues of diversion, even if significant financial incentives to act recklessly exist. It is
this reckless conduct, rather than specifically delineated conspiracies to violate the CSA, that has
propelled this crisis.

55

U.S. v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2006).
Mens Rea in Recklessness and Negligence, Supra note 33.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
56

12

Facts about contemporary pharmaceutical manufacturers and the litigation surrounding
their conduct, will greatly illuminate the statute as it stands and shortcomings stemming from the
higher intent standard.
PART III: Contemporary Litigation, Shortfalls, the State of Things
The Opioid Epidemic, unsurprisingly, has given rise to a flurry of litigation involving
prescription drug manufacturers.60 These include marquee companies such as Purdue Pharma
L.P. and Johnson & Johnson.61 In 2019, more than six big-named pharmaceutical companies
disclosed in their regulatory filings that they have received grand jury subpoenas from the
Eastern District of New York in connection with criminal investigations involving opioids.62
Prosecutors sought to prove whether pharmaceutical companies knowingly allowed opioid
medications to flood the country.63
A. Purdue – OxyContin:
Purdue Pharma L.P., along with its subsidiaries and controlling family (the “Sacklers”),
are often viewed as the face of the modern-day opioid epidemic.64 The Sacklers, and their
companies, have received probably the most scrutiny for their contributions to the opioid
epidemic. The effect of this scrutiny is evident by the flurry of institutions rushing to remove the
family’s name from their donations.65 One of the main reasons for this scrutiny stems from the
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fact that Purdue Pharma L.P. is the creator of the drug OxyContin. When discussing Purdue, it is
important to understand at least a brief history of the company as well as the litigation that has
surrounded its opiate manufacturing.
Dr. Arthur Sackler was known as the patriarch of the family and along with his brothers,
purchased an unknown patent-medicine company called Purdue Frederick in 1952.66 This
eventually became Purdue Pharma L.P. In 1997, Sackler was posthumously inducted into the
Medical Advertising Hall of Fame for his work in combining advertising with pharmaceutical
promotion.67 His so-called “knack” for marketing has been described differently by his peers:
“Most of the questionable practices that propelled the pharmaceutical industry into the scourge it
is today can be attributed to Arthur Sackler.”68 These persuasive, and often, deceptive marketing
practices, are embedded in the DNA of Purdue and somewhat pervasive in the marketing sector
of the pharmaceutical industry.
When Arthur Sackler died in 1987, his brothers Raymond and Mortimer successfully
took control of his stake.69 At the same time, the company engineered its new drug: OxyContin,
and with it, stepped into unimaginable wealth.
Raymond’s son, Richard, was centrally involved in the effort to find a new “wonder
drug” to replace the expiring patent on their drug MS Contin. A memo sent to Richard in 1990
discussed the MS Contin would soon “face such serious generic competition that other
controlled-release opioids must be considered.”70 The memo continued on by discussing efforts
to create a product that contained a drug developed by German scientists, known as oxycodone.71
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At the same time, internal emails and other documentation showed the company’s push to launch
the drug, and its plan for targeting the drug to non-cancer patients with chronic pain.72 Board
minutes following the 1995 approval of the drug by the FDA, reflect this notion, stating that the
firm did “not want to niche OxyContin just for cancer pain.”73
The Sackler connection to OxyContin has remained obscure as a result of the fact that
Purdue is not a publicly traded company, so disclosures to shareholders are not necessary.74
Though it is alleged that throughout the existence of OxyContin, the money from the sale of this
drug has flowed from the company directly to the various branches of the Sackler family.75
In 2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office (“GAO”) conducted a study to determine:
“(1) how OxyContin was marketed and promoted, (2) what factors contributed to the abuse and
diversion of OxyContin, and (3) what actions have been taken to address OxyContin abuse and
diversion.”76
It found that by 2003, nearly 50% of all OxyContin prescribers were primary care
physicians.77 The DEA expressed concerns that “Purdue’s aggressive marketing of OxyContin
focused on promoting the drug to treat a wide range of conditions to physicians who may not
have been adequately trained in pain management.”78
The study then cites three primary reasons for the prolific rise of OxyContin use, abuse,
and diversion. First, the notion that the drug is available in doses twice as potent as morphine,
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making it attractive for misuse and diversion.79 Second, the original warning label describes
methods that patients should not use when ingesting the drug.80 In doing so, the firm explicitly
lays out methods for ingesting the drug in a manner that would bypass time-release protocols and
enable an rapid release of OxyContin into the system. Finally, it points to the significant increase
in availability of the drug and posits that this likely increased opportunities for abuse and
diversion.81
There have been hundreds of lawsuits against Purdue since the release of OxyContin.82 In
a 2002 suit, discovery demonstrated through thousands of documents that the company was
perpetrating a fraud against the entire medical community.83 These documents shed light on the
notion that assertions about the drug safety came straight from marketing, and not the scientific
department. Within the first five years of its existence, OxyContin was generating one billion
dollars each year.84 Some sales representatives were earning hundreds of thousands of dollars in
yearly commissions, tied directly to their pushing and sale of OxyContin to physicians. Internal
memoranda from 2001 describe the company’s sale force as the “most valuable resource” that it
possessed.85
Purdue plead guilty to criminal misbranding in a case brought by Virginia federal
prosecutors.86 In the plea, the firm noted that they had marketed OxyContin with the intent to
“defraud or mislead.”87 Despite Richard Sackler’s leadership role at the firm, he was not charged
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with any crimes. Some executives received probation, and collectively, they paid approximately
thirty-five million dollars in fines.88 The firm itself consented to pay an additional six-hundred
million dollars.89 Senator Arlen Specter, a Republican from Pennsylvania, is quoted as
characterizing these fines as an, “expensive license for criminal misconduct.”90
The Sackler family is credited by some as de-stigmatizing opioids and creating a climate
that allowed for other pharmaceuticals to capitalize and begin marketing their own opiates and
opioid related products.91
In 2015, Purdue settled a case in Kentucky for twenty-four million dollars.92 The firm
admitted no liability and was able to keep from the public Richard Sackler’s own deposition and
internal documents obtained through discovery.93 Purdue has been known to claim that they
never lost this or any other case.94 However, it is more accurate to say that they have never lost a
trial because they seemingly always settle. This has kept much of its internal documents out of
the scrutiny of the public theater.
Following a significant outcry, Richard Sackler stepped down as the president of Purdue
Pharma L.P. in 2003.95 However, he remained co-chair on the company’s board of directors.96
It is alleged that the marketing and sales teams for the company implemented their I.M.S.
data, as well as targeted local methadone clinics, to efficiently direct their sales efforts.97 Purdue
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also supposedly offered free samples of their product to customers.98 At the induction of
OxyContin, the company created a program that sought to encourage doctors to issue coupons
for free OxyContin prescriptions, effectively hooking individuals to their product for free.99
These allegations, if true, can be analogized to a street-level drug dealer giving their customers
“their first taste” free of charge. When the program was finally discontinued, customers had
redeemed nearly thirty-four thousand coupons.100 What is perhaps most troubling is the fact that
in 2015, Purdue received FDA approval to market the drug to children above the age of ten.101
Purdue has consistently rallied against any efforts at regulation against their practices,
often harping on the notion that patients in pain will not be able to be treated without the benefits
of OxyContin.102 This is Purdue using one of the aims of the CSA to deflect the constraints of
regulation. From 2006 through 2015, Purdue and a number of other opioid manufacturers spent
almost one billion dollars on lobby efforts and political contributions to fight against any
legislation that would curtail their sales.103 To put this number into context, this is roughly eight
times the amount spent by the firearms lobby during the same period.104
In 2017, Forbes estimated that the Sackler family continued to receive approximately
seven hundred million a year from their companies’ profits.105 Purdue has established a
subsidiary called Mundipharma. This company is currently attempting to pierce foreign markets
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and flood the globe with OxyContin. In 2014, a Mundipharma executive is quoted as saying:
“Every single patient that is in emerging markets should have access to our medicines.”106
On September 15, 2019, Purdue agreed to a framework for settling the various United
States opioid actions it is facing.107 These actions involve twenty-four state attorneys general and
various offices from five United States territories.108 Five elements comprise the settlement,
which also comes in tandem with the company declaring bankruptcy in an effort to mitigate
financial judgments against them:
First, the owners of Purdue must contribute all of its assets to a trust or other entity
established for the benefit of claimants and the American people.109
Second, Purdue is allowed to dissolve and reformulate as a new company, being
governed by an entirely new board of directors selected by the claimants and subject to the
approval of the Bankruptcy Court.110
Third, the new company will contribute tens of millions of doses of opioid overdose
reversal and medication for addiction treatment, at reduced or no cost.111
Fourth, the new company must agree to be bound by injunctive relief, including
restrictions on its sale and marketing of opioids.112
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Last, in addition to the one hundred percent contribution of assets by Purdue, the Sackler
families must contribute at least three billion dollars, with the potential for additional monetary
contributes from the sales of their out-of-country pharmaceutical businesses.113
During the settlement process, New York’s attorney general’s office has discovered that
members of the Sackler family have secretly transferred approximately one billion dollars in
funds to Swiss bank accounts that the they control.114 The state’s attorney general was quoted as
stating: “Records from one financial institution alone have shown approximately $1 billion in
wire transfers between the Sacklers, entities they control, and different financial institutions,
including those that have funneled funds into Swiss bank accounts.”115 The family has an
estimated worth of approximately thirteen billion dollars.116 Though, various state attorneys
general find it likely that the family has substantially more wealth shielded from the public.
While this litigation is still ongoing, it seems likely that the Sackler family will be able to
continue to escape individual criminal wrongdoing, while rebranding their company, and making
off with hundreds of millions, if not, billions in gains. They are not even prohibited from
continuing the sale of opiates.
B. Insys Therapeutics:
In 2017, Insys Therapeutics former CEO and founder John Kapoor was indicted on
charges that he provided kickbacks to physicians for prescribing the company’s potent synthetic
opiate: fentanyl opioid Subsys.117 Two regional sales directors and a VP were also implicated in
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this wrongdoing.118 In the indictment, these individuals were alleged, with others at Insys, to
have bribed doctors to write higher prescriptions of their drug, despite the fact that their drug was
meant only for the treatment of cancer patients with severe pain119. Additionally, it is alleged that
Kapoor with his associated, conspired to manipulate and mislead insurance companies in an
effort to have Subsys covered when prescribed to those who do not have cancer. Kapoor was
found guilty on charges of conspiracy to commit racketeering and was convicted along with his
associates, on related charges.120
Following this conviction, the district court judge partially overturned the executive’s
convictions for conspiring to illicitly distribute a controlled substance, in violation of the CSA.121
In her ruling, the Judge explained that the evidence gathered by prosecutors and presented at trial
was not supporting of the jury’s finding that the executives, “meant to persuade providers to
prescribe Subsys to patients for which the drug was not intended.”122 Though, the judge
continued by harping on the notion that the evidence, “could be readily understood as proving
that the defendants did not care whether patients needed the drug, that still is not enough to prove
the requisite intent.”123 She then chastises the government for not pursuing bribery or kickback
charges, which she apparently believed could have been more readily demonstrated by the
evidence. Clearly the mens rea standard was crucial to the overturned CSA conviction. It is
significant that while the judge partially overturned the conviction, the jury found them guilty for
violations of the CSA based on the factual evidence.124
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Two important distinctions must be discussed in the context of this prosecution. First, the
notion that prosecutors should have pursued individual accountability via another statute outside
of the CSA, because there existed much clearer evidence for bribery and kickbacks. And second,
it is important to note that this company is significantly smaller than other opioid manufacturer’s
like Purdue Pharma L.P.
Based on the judge’s remarks regarding the available evidence, it clear that an easier case
could have been made for bribery and kickback violations. At the same time, a reckless level of
intent regarding the diversion of opiates was exhibited by the executives. At the ended of the
day, opiates were misused in the same or a similar fashion as they would have been abused had
the executives acted in an intentional manner, rather than merely a reckless one. Opiates were
diverted and prescribed to individuals who did not have a legitimately need for these drugs. The
recklessness of these actions is not disputed by the jury who found them guilty of conspiring to
violate the CSA, it is not disputed by the judge who overturned that portion of the conviction
based entirely on this recklessness, and it is not disputed by the prosecution who brought the
case. United States Attorney Andrew L. Lelling, the prosecutor heading this investigation,
discussed this reckless conduct and his desire to pursue executives acting in a reckless manner
concerning opiate diversion: “Just as we would street-level drug dealers, we will hold
pharmaceutical executives responsible for fueling the opioid epidemic by recklessly and illegally
distributing these drugs, especially while conspiring to commit racketeering along the way.”125
This quote and the tack the prosecution took regarding Insys, demonstrates a willingness
by the federal government to hold these individuals accountable. At the same time, the ruling
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highlights the shortcoming of the available tools prosecutors can use to curb the opioid epidemic
and provide accountability for this conduct. As it stands, if a company did not engage in bribes,
kickbacks, or other federal violations, but then acted in a reckless manner, causing controlled
substances to be diverted in the process, they cannot be prosecuted or held accountable in
anyway.
The prosecution demonstrated a willingness to hold these Insys executives accountable
for their conduct. However, it is unclear if a similar appetite exists with regards to taking on
much larger companies who have intentionally or recklessly diverted opioids.
C. Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals:
Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals is a large, multibillion-dollar specialty pharmaceutical
company that manufacturers a large variety of different name-brand and generic drugs.126
Amongst these drugs are various opioid pain medications and opioid addiction treatment
medications.127 The company is the largest generic opioid manufacturer in the United States128.
On April 21, 2020, the state of New York charged Mallinckrodt Plc in a civil action, with
misrepresenting the effects and dangers of their opioid drug Oxycodone Hydrochloride, thereby
committing insurance fraud.129 Allegedly, the company exaggerated the benefits of a long-term
opiate, while minimizing the potential addiction and abuse risks of the product. The state alleges
that this was all done while knowing that the conduct would lead to fraudulent insurance claims
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as a result of unnecessary payments.130 This action is part of a regulatory probe by the state into
entities that are suspected of contributing to the opioid crisis.131
It is important to note that this, as well as the other above actions, are on-going. None of
the allegations should be considered true until substantiated by evidence and proven in court.
That being said, these allegations, if proven true, point to a culture of deceit aimed at
manipulating the public, the government, and society at large, in an effort to boost sales. It would
be hard to believe that such widespread misconduct could occur within a pharmaceutical
company without the knowledge, or at least, reckless disregard, of some executives. However, as
of now, no executive has been implicated in this manner.
The government has taken up this action in the wake of a February 25, 2020 agreement
by the company to pay approximately $1.6 billion to settle a significant number of lawsuits by
states and local governments with regard to allegations that it helped perpetuate the opioid
epidemic.132 The agreement also mandates the company’s generic drug business go into
bankruptcy, at the same time, the company is still allowed to manufacture and distribute
opiates.133 The government has sought civil penalties rather than criminally charging individual
executives. While more knowledge of the matter must come-to-light, it may be inferred that this
decision to pursue civil charges against the company as a whole, criminal charges for
individuals, may be a result of the ease with which the former may be achieved when compared
to the latter. At the same time, a compelling case could be made that that holding these
executives accountable would provide significant deterrence for the next executives attempting
to exploit the system to bolster profits.
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These examples demonstrate, or at least allege, some of the most egregious conduct
undertaken by pharmaceutical companies and their executives in an effort to bolster profits.
Additionally, they also demonstrate the barriers presented to prosecutors attempting to hold these
individuals accountable for their own wrongdoing.
PART IV: Proposed Change to the Law and its Effects
The response to the Opioid Crisis has been insufficient. While strides have been made to
assess the scope of the crisis and care for the individuals directly affected, little has been done to
curb the environment that has fostered this crisis. Look no further than the HHS 5-point plan to
understand that a comprehensive approach towards curtailing this issue is not being sought. Only
a reduction of the mens rea component of the CSA from a “willful and intentional” standard to a
less rigorous “recklessness” standard would substantially facilitate prosecuting individuals to
such an extent that it would curb this environment of abuse.
In April 2017, Secretary Thomas Price announced the Department of Health and Human
Services’ 5-point strategy for combating the opioid crisis.134 This strategy sought to improve
access to treatment and recovery services, promote the use of overdose-reversing drugs,
strengthening the government’s understanding of the epidemic through better public health
surveillance, providing supporting for pain management and addiction research, and advancing
better practices for pain management in general.135 These aims focused primarily on contending
with members of the public who are already dependent on opiates while bolstering the
government’s understanding of the nature, scope, and effect of this crisis. None of the facets of
this plan sought to ramp up enforcement against or curb misuse and diversion by registrants. Nor
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do they seek to apply any sort of consequences for individual manufacturers, particularly those
with a hand in the opioid crisis.
It is important to note that while this plan is inadequate with regard to addressing
underlying causes of the crisis, it serves as a necessary prophylactic regarding society’s ability to
contend with the corrosive effects of this crisis. It is significant for the government to vie with
these other facets of this epidemic. However, without an adequately robust response, not just to
the effects of the crisis, but the underlying cause, it will likely never be sufficiently addressed.
Additional examples of government initiatives attempting to contend with this crisis are similarly
inadequate. Often, they are framed in such a way that they can be touted as a success. However,
the actual effect of these initiatives falls short of what is necessary to sufficiently mitigate this
crisis.
On October 25, 2018, the Department of Justice announced the formation of the
Appalachian Regional Prescription Opioid Strike Force (“ARPO”).136 This strike force consists
of a joint partnership between nine U.S. Attorney’s Offices within five states.137 Additionally, it
encompasses the knowledge and resources of the FBI, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Office of the Inspector General, and the DEA.138 The goal of this strike force is to
investigate and dismantle fraud schemes related to health care within the Appalachian region,
with a particular emphasis on prosecuting medical professionals and “others involved in the
illegal prescription and distribution of opioids.”139
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In April 2019, the Department announced that its ARPO Strike Force charged sixty
defendants from eleven different districts for their alleged role in various diversion and health
care fraud schemes.140 None of these individuals include drug manufacturers or executives,
instead the group is comprised of approximately thirty-one doctors and various pharmacists,
nurse practitioners, and other medical professionals.141 In a press release, Attorney General
William Barr stated that the crisis, “is the deadliest drug crisis in American history.”142 This must
mean, that in his opinion, this crisis is more deadly than the crack epidemic in the 1980’s, and
presumably, warrants at least a reciprocal, if not greater response. HHS Secretary Alex Azar
harps on the goal for this initiative, stating that the reduction of the “illicit supply of opioids is a
crucial element of President Trump’s plan to end this public health crisis.”143 Finally, Barr gives
credit to the department for “doing its part” to put an end to the crisis.
This release hypes charges brought against thirty-one doctors as if its effect shares some
type of equivalence with taking down a company like Purdue or Mallinckrodt. It then alludes to
the significance of reducing the supply of illicit opioids. And finally, discusses the notion that the
Federal Government is doing its part.
It seems that the Federal Government needs to be doing more than just “its part” if it is
legitimately seeking to bring about an end to this crisis, which, in its own words, is “the deadliest
drug crisis in American history.” Unfortunately, it seems that this Strike Force and the Federal
Government’s response is inadequate. To a skeptical mind, it may seem like nothing but a
political maneuver. Touting the disruption of a relatively small number of medical professionals
140
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who have taken part in illegal prescribing in a specific region of the country, is a far cry from
affecting a sufficient reduction in the illicit supply of opioids nationwide. One significant way
the government may bring about this supposed objective is by prosecuting the manufacturers and
registrants who have allowed for this environment to flourish into a crisis. Until this occurs, true
accountability cannot be obtained.
The allegations against Purdue Pharma L.P., if true, are an excellent demonstration of the
lack of consequences for individuals, particularly those who have helped create this crisis.
Throughout the years the Sackler family has been directly involved with the sale and promotion
of this drug. However, they have received little or no accountability. Only now, when public
sentiment surrounding this epidemic has hit a fever pitch, is anything remotely resembling
individual accountability being sought. The Sacklers have been able to limit discovery and use
bankruptcy and out-of-court settlements to their advantage to restrict the information about their
own individual wrongdoing. At the same time, they are allowed to re-brand and continue to sell
the drug, while still holding hundreds of millions, if not billions, in offshore money and assets.
The price they paid for their role in this crisis is billons of the company’s money, a fraction of
their own money, and their board seats. That is all. The only lesson that can be taken from the
conduct of the Sackler’s and the government’s response is that crime pays.
A reduction of the mens rea standard to a recklessness standard would have greatly
facilitated prosecutors seeking to hold the Sackler’s proverbial feet to the fire. Most notably, the
Sackler conduct has been characterize as lacking any semblance of remorse or individual
responsibility. Based on what has been proven, coupled with the swirl of allegations, it’s likely
that this company has been allowed to use misinformation, lobbying, legal tactics, and financial
trickery to engineer a crisis, profit of the crisis, and effectively ride off into the sunset. All while
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placing the blame squarely on the population they have targeted with their drugs. Perversely, the
company has tried to defend itself from accountability and regulation by using one of the aims of
the CSA as a shield: the notion that patients with pain cannot receive access to their medication
without Purdue. It is in fact the opposite, this company has directly caused pain for thousands , if
not millions of people across the globe.
The federal government often seeks settlements with regard to resolving disputes with
large entities. While the Purdue settlement is a particularly large one, it pales in comparison to
the damage the company has done, the gains the family has received, and the overall wrongdoing
committed. Charging the individual executives of Purdue in a similar manner that members of an
international drug cartel would be charged, could not only increase the potential settlement
amount received, but would send a strong message to the other manufacturers that if they act in a
manner similar to a cartel, they will be treated in a manner similar to a cartel. This is the type of
action that is necessary to combat future instances of this wrongdoing. Otherwise, this is
tantamount to giving pharmaceutical companies an “expensive license for criminal conduct.”144
This is particularly egregious when the conduct is so widespread, with far reaching
consequences. A lack of an adequate response to this extreme conduct will only serve to further
reduce public sentiment regarding the Department and create a greater dissatisfaction with the
healthcare sector as a whole.
The judge who ruled on Kapoor and Insys specifically cited the recklessness of Kapoor
and his executives, stating that they likely did not care if the patients needed the drug. Profits
were their key motivation. Simultaneously, she expressly mentioned that the government was
unable to satisfy the intent standard to prove a conspiracy to violate the CSA.145 It is not atypical
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for prosecutors to seek charges for more readily provable crimes, though greater wrongdoing
may exist. At the same time, it is not just to charge an individual with an anti-kickback statute
violation, or bribery, just because it is more difficult to prove a drug conspiracy based on state of
the evidence, when the facts demonstrate that a drug conspiracy occurred. It is clear that in Insys,
a conspiracy existed. Whether or not the individuals involved intended for the specific
conspiracy to occur, or whether they were indifferent to its probably occurrence, should not be
the sole factor that prosecutors consider when deciding whether or not to bring charges.
Discovery hurdles should not halt the government’s response to a company that is clearly
conspiring to violate the CSA.
Intent is often the guiding principal here. Certain violations, though they may factually
have occurred, are not done with the full knowledge of the individuals. Prosecutors are able to
consider the specific case and make a recommendation as to whether or not charges should be
brought. Based on this, a reduction of the mens rea standard will not lead to an increase in
frivolous or unnecessary prosecutions. Quite the contrary, it will facilitate the government’s
enforcement of this crisis. Companies acting recklessly who the government may determine do
not deserve criminal prosecution rising to the level of a cartel, may have other, lesser charges
brought against them. But it is of paramount importance the government is bestowed with the
tools to prosecute these individuals. This is not a proposal that seeks to reduce the mens rea
component for all crimes, or for all violations of the CSA. Instead, it seeks to specifically target
CSA violations in the context of healthcare, to further promote trust in the government and the
sector, while curtailing future potential epidemics and violations.
The twin aims of the CSA, promoting access to medication for patients who need it,
while shielding the country from diversion, are both met and will continue to proliferate with this
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change in the law. It is clear that this change will serve as a greater deterrent to diversion. If this
deterrent was not necessary, this crisis would not exist. Issues surrounding the access of pain
management medications are minimal if they exist at all. The country is flooded with these
drugs. Overprescribing of all manners of opiates, in all shapes, sizes, and strengths, has occurred
and continues to occur each day. It is important that individuals are able to continue to receive
these medications, but in a manner sufficient to address their particular condition and needs. Not
in such a way that gets them “hooked” and will lead to a lifetime of dependency issues or issues
with other, more serious or unregulated drugs.
It is imperative that the government adopts a reduction in the mens rea component of the
CSA if its goal is to bring about accountability for those who engineered this crisis. Taking these
matters seriously and prosecuting the individuals for the full extent of the wrongdoing that
occurred will restore trust to the public while setting an example for future registrants who may
seek to engage in similar behavior in the name of profits. At the same time, it is recommended
that the CSA intent standard be reduced to a “recklessness” standard, rather than a negligence
standard that would be more applicable towards tortious violations. Additionally, to prevent the
overzealous pursuit of all drug violations, it is suggested that this reduction in mens rea is only
applicable to conduct undertaken by healthcare professionals or pharmaceutical manufacturers
who are registrants with the DEA, or who act on behalf of registrants. This should not apply to
individual civilians who have not been registered with the DEA.

CONCLUSION:
The scope of this crisis is grand. Therefore, tremendous action must undertaken to
sufficiently address these issues. Declaring this epidemic a crisis, and attempting to contend with
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it through the HHS’s 5-point plan is a strong start. A similar case can be made regarding the
Department of Justice’s implementation of strike forces like ARPO. However, it is insufficient to
ensure that this crisis will not continue. Executives will continue to cut corners in the name of
profits, regardless of the effect on public health, unless a serious threat of individual
accountability exists. A reduction of the mens rea component of the CSA from a “willful and
intentional” standard to a lesser “recklessness” standard would substantially facilitate
prosecuting individual executives in the pharmaceutical industry and would help curb the
rampant and widespread diversion of opiates occurring in the pharmaceutical sector.
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